From RAND corporation: Countering Russian Social Media Influence ,
Published Nov 1, 2018,
by Elizabeth Bodine-Baron, Todd C. Helmus, Andrew Radin, Elina Treyger
{ISBN: 978-1-9774-0182-3}

HST 3: Current Efforts and Proposed Solutions

pag 42-43 - "Coordinating Detection of Disinformation"

Workshop participants strongly agreed that it is the responsibil-ity of the U.S. government to collect and analyze information to help. We note that it is possible that private companies could simply create the impression that they are making such changes rather than genuinely doing so, in order to avoid the threat of regulation.
Current Efforts and Proposed Solutions identify malign actors, because it not only has well-established paths for critical input from the intelligence community (in contrast to the private sector) but also has the responsibility to work for the public interest.
To this end, Facebook convened a meeting in June 2018 with officials from the FBI, DHS, and other tech companies, including Google, Twitter, Apple, Snap, and others, to develop closer ties with law enforcement to prevent abuse of their platforms. To the extent possible allowed by classification requirements, the U.S. government should share information on adversary accounts, Russian strategy, tactics, and intent with both private companies, academics, and the American public.
Despite difficulties that may exist and the perception that government organizations have abrogated their responsibilities, we emphasize that the U.S. government could and should lead efforts in this area, and should not leave the initiative to social media platforms alone.
To coordinate and track these efforts, it might be necessary to establish an independent monitoring organization. Such a working group could be based on similar organizations that promote increas-ing cybersecurity, or even prior efforts like the Active Measures Work-ing Group (AMWG), established in the 1980s to monitor and expose Soviet disinformation campaigns. A new AMWG-like working group, including participants from government, academia, and, most impor-tantly, the private sector, would coordinate policy and platform solu-tions with major technology companies, review and propose legislative solutions, and educate the press and the public. Such a government organization could also perform independent research to monitor social media adherence to best practices when it comes to identifying the spreaders of disinformation, providing information, and calling out abuse.